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The Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine and Practicably
Irrigable Acreage: Past, Present, and Future
Jennele Morris 0 'Hair*
Federal reserved water rights have become the subject of increasing
contention over the last decade as non-federal water users compete with
federal Indian and non-Indian water users for a finite supply of water.
This article will review issues relevant to use of this water supply. First,
this article will articulate the historical background of the federal reserved
water rights doctrine and the practicably irrigable acreage standard.
Second, the development of the federal reserved rights doctrine,
limitations on the doctrine, and the impact it has already had on water
users will be reviewed. Third, recent decisions in this area are analyzed,
showing possible trends in the use of the federal reserved rights doctrine.
This article will conclude that the federal reserved rights doctrine has
been significantly narrowed in recent years, and a jurisprudential basis
exists for further constriction of the doctrine.
I.

THE GENESIS OF FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS

A.

The Winters Case

The seminal decision on federal reserved rights is the 1908 case of
Winters v. United States. 1 While the holding in that case was very
narrow, it has had-and will continue to have-a profound impact on
water law and water allocation in the West. In that case, the United
States brought suit to enjoin non-Indian landowners or "homesteaders,"
who had made homestead and other public land entries along the Milk
River in Montana, from constructing or maintaining dams or reservoirs
on the Milk River or otherwise preventing the water from flowing to the
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. 2
The United States faced a tough battle as the treaty establishing the
reservation had not spoken regarding water rights. More ominous was

* Copyright"' 1996 by Jennele Morris O'Hair. The author gratefully acknowledges
the assistance of Robert F. Palmquist in the preparation of portions of this article.
1. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
2. /d. at 565. The Fort Belknap Reservation had been established by treaty in May
1888 as a reservation for the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Indian tribes.
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the fact that upstream non-Indian diverters had started using water before
the tribes; 3 under the doctrine of prior appropriation4 the upstream nonIndian diverters would have won. But the Supreme Court held that the
federal government, in establishing the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation,
impliedly reserved enough water to satisfy reservation purposes. 5
In rendering this decision, the Supreme Court noted that the Indians,
in agreeing to occupy the reservation, had reduced their land holdings
from "a very much larger tract" of land adequate to the "habits and
wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people" 6 to those of "a pastoral and
civilized people" while occupying the reservation. 7 The Court also noted
that the reservation lands "were arid and, without irrigation, were
practically valueless. " 8 Finally, the Court invoked the "rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians" that "ambiguities
occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians. " 9 The
Supreme Court concluded that "the government did reserve [water rights
to the reservation] ... for a use which would be necessarily continued
through [the] years. This was done May 1, 1888 [the date of establishment of the Fort Belknap reservation]." 10 The Winters decision formed
the basis for all subsequent federal reserved rights cases.

I.

Conflicting Federal Promises

In essence, Winters dealt with the federal government's conflicting
promises to the homesteaders and the Indians. The federal government
promised the Indians that if they gave up their huge landholdings and
their nomadic ways, they would be guaranteed a permanent homeland on
which they could engage in pastoral pursuits. At the same time,
however, the government promised homesteaders that if they entered
upon the public lands and appropriated water to a beneficial use, they
could acquire vested water rights under state or territorial water law
systems, and the federal government promised to defer to those systems.

3. /d. at 567.
4. The doctrine of prior appropriation developed in the West as the method for
allocating scarce water resources. The classic statement of the doctrine is "first in time is first
in right," meaning that the first person to appropriate the water (the senior appropriator) has
the superior right to its use, with later appropriators being entitled to water only after the senior
appropriator's right has been satisfied.
5. Winters, 207 U.S. at 567.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

/d.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 577.
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In Winters, these conflicting promises were resolved in favor of the
Indians.
Today, the same problem of conflicting federal promises continues
to play a large role in pending federal reserved rights cases. But in
future federal reserved rights cases the answer may not be so simple.
The Supreme Court may well find a way to resolve the conflicting federal
promises in favor of non-Indians.

2.

Winters' Limitations

The Winters case has come to stand for the proposition that the
federal government, in establishing Indian reservations, impliedly
reserved enough water to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. The
United States brought suit on behalf of two tribes to halt upstream
diversions by non-Indians who began using the water before the Indians
pursuant to patents under the homestead and desert land laws. 11 All the
Court actually did in Winters was affirm a decree enjoining the nonIndian upstream diverters from interfering with the tribes' use of 5,000
miners inches of water from the Milk River. 12 Thus, the actual holding
of the case was quite narrow. Considering what the case has come to
stand for, it is amazing that the opinion of the Court is less than three
pages long.

B.

Antecedents to the Winters Opinion

Though Winters v. United States is usually cited as the seminal case
in federal reserved water rights jurisprudence, the Winters court itself and
a number of commentators have referred to several previous opinions as
laying the groundwork for the Winters decision. Indeed, the Winters
Court acknowledged in 1908 that "the power of the [federal] Government
to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state
laws is not denied, and could not be." 13

I.

The Winans Case

One of the cases cited for this proposition by the Winters Court was
United States v. Winans. 14 Notably, Winans was not a water law case;
it involved an Indian reservation's fishing rights as established by treaty.
The Supreme Court held that lands that were formerly owned by the

11. !d. at 565, 567-69.
12. !d. at 565, 578.
13. !d. at 577 (citing United States v. Rio Grande Ditch & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,
702 (1898)).
14. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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Indians, but which ended up in the hands of non-Indian settlers, remained
subject to the Indian right to fish as conferred by the treaty. 15 The
Court stated:
The extinguishment of the Indian title, opening the land for settlement
and preparing the way for future States, were appropriate to the objects
for which the United States held the Territory. And surely it was
within the competency of the Nation to secure to the Indians such a
remnant of the great rights they possessed as 'taking fish at all usual
and accustomed places.' 16

As it later did in Winters, the Court resolved the problem of conflicting
federal promises in favor of the Indians. In so doing, the Supreme Court
invoked several canons of construction that have arisen in Indian law.
Winans held that "the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians,
but a grant of rights from them- a reservation of those not granted. " 17
This is one of the most important canons of construction in Indian law:
that all rights not expressly ceded by a tribe or taken by the federal
government are reserved to the tribe. Winans also enunciated this important canon of Indian treaty construction:
[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians as 'that unlettered people'
understood it, and 'as justice and reason demand in all cases where
power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and
protection,' and counterpoise the inequality 'by the superior justice
which looks only to the substance of the right without regard to
technical rules.' (citation omitted) How the treaty in question was
understood may be gathered from the circumstances. 18

Thus, together, Winters and Winans illustrate the application of
several important canons of Indian treaty construction: (1) that ambiguities in a treaty will be resolved in favor of the Indians; (2) that a treaty
will be construed as the Indians understood it at the time it was entered
into; (3) that the absence of an express reservation of water does not
mean the Indians failed to reserve water for their reservation; and (4) that
congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights must be unequivocally expressed.
Another important canon of construction that has arisen in the federal
reserved rights doctrine is that a waiver of an Indian tribe's sovereign
immunity will be strictly construed. For instance, in Idaho Department

15.
16.
17.
18.

/d. at 381-82.
Id. at 384.
/d. at 381.
Id. at 380-81.
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of Water Resources v. United States, 19 the United States asked the court
to order the Idaho Department of Water Resources to accept filing of the
government's claims in the Snake River adjudication without the payment
of filing fees. The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the McCarran
Amendment2° did not prohibit the State of Idaho from collecting filing
fees from the U.S. government for its claims in the adjudication?' The ·
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the McCarran Amendment
did not waive the sovereign immunity of the United States from payment
of filing fees imposed by Idaho. The Court reached its conclusion
because the language of the McCarran Amendment making "the State
laws" applicable to the United States was not sufficiently specific to
constitute a waiver. 22
Indian law is not water law, and therefore one might query why
canons of Indian law construction should make any difference. They do
matter, however, because when dealing with water for an Indian
reservation, one must contend not only with principles of water law but
also with principles of Indian law. It is well to keep these canons of
construction in mind as the outcome of many perplexing federal reserved
rights issues may be resolved by invoking one of them.

2.

United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation

The other case cited in the Winters opinion was United States v. Rio
Grande Dam & Irrigation Company. 23 This case recognized the power
of a state to change "the common law rule as to streams within its
dominion" to permit appropriation of flowing waters for various
purposes. 24 However, the Supreme Court limited this state power,
holding that:

19. 832 P.2d 289 (Idaho 1992).
20. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1995). By the McCarran Amendment, Congress consented to
joinder of the United States as a defendant in a state court water rights adjudication, where the
United States owns water rights on the river system, but only when the adjudication is a
comprehensive general adjudication of all rights of all water users on the stream, i.e., an inter
sese proceeding. See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); John B. Weldon, Jr. and
Mikel L. Moore, General Water Rights Adjudication in Arizona: Yesterday, Today and
Tomorrow, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 727 (1985). Federal reserved water rights are within the
scope of the McCarran Amendment's waiver of sovereign immunity on behalf of the United
States. See, e.g., United States v. District Court in and for County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520
(1971); United States v. District Court in and for Water Division No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
21. 832 P.2d at 297.
22. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1 (1993).
23. 174 U.S. 690 (1898).
24. !d. at 703.
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in the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot by its
legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of lands
bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far at
least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government
property. 25

C.

Who "Reserved" the Water?

Commentators disagree on whether the federal government, acting
on behalf of the Indians, "reserved" the necessary water for Indian
reservations, or whether it was the Indians themselves, in agreeing to
move onto a federal reservation, who reserved their water rights.
According to historian Norris Hundley, Jr., the Supreme Court in
Winters "located authority to reserve water in both the Indians and the
U.S."26
In making this assertion, Hundley looks to language in the Winters
opinion that arguably supports both positions. For example, Justice
McKenna stated that "[t]he Government is asserting the rights of the
Indians. " 27 The Winters opinion also states that "[t]he power of the
Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation
under the state laws is not denied, and could not be . . . . That the
Government did reserve them we have decided, and for a use which
would be necessarily continued through [the] years. " 28 In a more recent
federal reserved rights case, Arizona v. California I, 29 the Supreme
Court stated, "We ... agree that the United States did reserve the water
rights for the Indians effective as of the time the Indian Reservations were
created. " 30
The Winters opinion also speaks, however, of the Indians' cession of
the large portion of their land to the government, and their retention or
reservation of some water rights. The Court refers to the non-Indian
parties' argument that the Indians ceded their lands, "yet made no
reservation of the waters. " 31 In disposing of this argument, the Winters
Court stated:

25. /d.
26. Norris Hundley, Jr., The Winters Decision and Indian Water Rights: A Mystery
Reexamined, 13 WEST. HIST. Q. 17, 34 (Jan. 1982).
27. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 546, 576 (1908).
28. /d. at 577 (emphasis added).
29. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
30. /d. at 600 (emphasis added).
31. Winters, 207 U.S. at 567.
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We realize that there is a conflict of implications, but that which makes
for the retention of the waters is of greater force than that which makes
for their cession. The Indians had command of the lands and the waters
- command of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, 'and
grazing roving herds of stock,' or turned to agriculture and the arts of
civilization. Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area of
their occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or
adequate ?32

The Court answered these questions in the negative.
The answer to the question of who reserved the water rights may
depend on how the Indian reservation was created. A legal distinction
may be made between reservations created by treaty prior to 1871, when
the United States ceased to make treaties with Indian tribes, and post1871 reservations created either by statute or executive order. Where a
reservation was created pursuant to a pre-1871 treaty, it may be
reasonable to assume that the water rights were reserved by the tribes
from their grants to the federal government, rather than being reserved
by the government for the Indians. 33
In an unpublished dissenting opinion in "Jloming v. United States, 34
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun, seemingly agreed with the Hundley point of view that
both the federal government and the Indians "reserved" the water.
Justice Brennan stated that "in many cases, including this one, Indian
reservations were created by treaty rather than unilateral action of the
Government, so that it is the intent of both parties that forms the basis for
the reservation of water rights. " 35

D.

Attributes of Federal Reserved Water Rights

A federal reserved water right differs from a state water right
acquired under the prior appropriation doctrine 36 in three important
ways. These differences can have a significant effect on non-federal
water users.

32. /d. (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) ("[T]he treaty was not
a grant of rights to the Indians but a grant of rights from them - a reservation of those not
granted.").
34. Draft of Unpublished Dissenting Opinion in Wyoming v. United States (June 1989)
(on file with the author). See discussion infra part III.A regarding the unpublished draft
opinion in that case.
35. Draft of Unpublished Dissenting Opinion in Wyoming v. United States (June 1989),
at 12 (emphasis added).
36. See supra note 4 for a definition of the prior appropriation doctrine.
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No Beneficial Use Requirement

Unlike state water rights based on the prior appropriation doctrine,
the validity of federal reserved rights does not depend on whether they
have been used. Under the prior appropriation doctrine, "beneficial use"
is the basis, measure, and limit of the water right. 37 Under the reserved
rights doctrine, "beneficial use" simply does not matter. As stated by
one court, the reserved rights doctrine "vests the United States with a
dormant and indefinite right that may not coincide with water uses
sanctioned by state law. "38
Thus, the validity of a federal reserved right does not depend on
continuous beneficial use, or any use at all. 39 State law-based water
rights, by marked contrast, are subject to forfeiture and abandonment for
nonuse. 40

2.

Priority date

The priority date of a federal reserved right is the date of establishment of the reservation, whereas the priority date of a state law-based
water right is the date beneficial use of the water begins. 4 I
A recent state decision has suggested that the priority date of a
federal reserved right may precede the reservation's establishment. In
New Mexico v. Lewis, 41 a divided panel of the New Mexico Court of
Appeals concluded that the priority date of the Mescalero Apache Tribe's
rights to the Rio Hondo River was the date of a treaty in which the
United States promised to create a reservation. The "lynch pin" of the

37. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-14l.B (1995) ("Beneficial use shall be the
basis, measure and limit to the use of water.").
38. United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491 (Colo. 1987).
39. However, in a case where a tribe sued the United States for damages for failing to
protect the tribe's water rights, the tribe's damages were limited by the amount of its historic
beneficial use. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl.
193, 214 nn.12-13 (1982).
40. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §45-141.C (1995), providing for forfeiture of
water rights when water is not used for five successive years. Last year the Arizona
Legislature amended this forfeiture statute to bolster the rights of state-law claimants by
providing that this does not apply to a water right initiated before June 12, 1919 (the date of
Arizona's first surface water code). H.B. 2276, 42d Legis., 1st Reg. Sess., Ch. 9, Sec. 3
(1995) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141.C). That amendment is now the subject
of a special action challenging its constitutionality brought by the Arizona Apache Tribes.
41. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705-11 (1978); In re General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 97 (Wyo.
1988), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
42. 861 P.2d 235,244 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 858 P.2d 85 (N.M. 1993).
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court's analysis was the canon of construction that Indian treaties are to
be construed liberally in favor of the Indians. 43
In a few cases, the courts have found "time immemorial" or
aboriginal priority for federal reserved rights. 44 Indian tribes routinely
argue that their water rights are entitled to aboriginal priority based on
their historic occupation of reservation lands. The U.S. Supreme Court
has not directly ruled on this important issue.
As one commentator aptly noted, "[b]ecause the priority date of the
reserved right relates back to the date of the reservation, reserved water
rights threaten existing water appropriators with divestment of their rights
without compensation. " 45 This is because most Indian reservations were
established prior to the initiation of non-Indian water uses.

3.

Quantification

In general, the amount of the federal reserved right is quantified
based on the amount of water reasonably necessary to fulfill the primary
purpose of the reservation. This is the holding of the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 1976 case of Cappaert v. United States. 46 Cappaert and
its progeny require a detailed look at the reservation purpose, as gleaned
from the treaty, executive order, Congressional enactment, or other
document creating the reservation. "The issue is whether the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available water. Intent
is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to
accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was created. " 47 The
43. The Lewis case is another good example of how Indian canons of construction may
be invoked where necessary to shore up Indian water rights. See supra part I.B.l.a.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1412-15 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied sub nom., 467 U.S. 1252 (1984) (holding that the Tribe's water rights were not created
by the treaty; rather, the treaty merely confirmed the continued existence of these rights); Joint
Board of Control v. United States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1007 (1988).
45. A. Boles & C. Elliott, United States v. New Mexico and the Course of Federal
Reserved Water Rights, 51 U. CoLO. L. REV. 209, 213 (1980).
46. 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976). See also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696,
700-03 (1978); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1409 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub
nom., Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491,
494 (Colo. 1987).
47. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 (1976). A pending Colorado case
provides an excellent illustration of the application of the primary purpose test. Water Division
No. 1 in Colorado held that the United States has a reserved right to all unappropriated water
in Rocky Mountain National Park for park purposes. Memorandum of Decision and Order,
District Court, Water Division No. 1, Case No. W-8439-76 (Colo. Dec. 29, 1993). Earlier,
the District Court denied the claim of the U.S. Forest Service for reserved water rights for the
purpose of stream channel maintenance. The court distinguished the two cases on the grounds
that the purposes for which national forests were created were largely economic in nature, and
to fulfill those purposes the stream channel only needs reasonable maintenance. However, to
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purpose of the reservation is determined as of the date of its establishment.48
Under state water law, the measure of a water right is the amount of
water beneficially used. 49 The doctrine of prior appropriation recognizes only the right to divert a quantified amount of water at a specific
location for a specific purpose. The federal reserved rights doctrine, by
contrast, vests the United States with a dormant right to an indefinite
quantity of water, and that right may not coincide with water uses
sanctioned by state law. 50
Professor Trelease has been a vocal critic of the federal reserved
rights doctrine because of the ambiguity of the reserved right:
The federal reserved water right is not like other water rights, at least
not like those in the West. It is not recorded, not fixed in size, not
dependent on beneficial use. When the Federal Government withdraws
a part of its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal
purpose, the Government by implication reserves enough of the
'appurtenant' unappropriated water to accomplish the purpose of the
reservation. 51

Despite these ambiguities, the federal reserved rights doctrine is a reality
that western water users must deal with as best they can.
II.

PRACTICABLY IRRIGABLE ACREAGE STANDARD OF QUANTIFICATION

In determining the amount of water reasonably necessary to satisfy
the primary purpose of an Indian reservation, the U.S. Supreme Court
has adopted a standard referred to as the "practicably irrigable acreage
standard of quantification" (PIA). This measure is important, as future
application of the PIA standard will determine how much of the water in
the west is left for non-Indian users.

fulfill the purpose of the national park, maintenance of the forests in their pristine condition is
required. See also United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 500 (Colo. 1987), discussed infra
note 86.
Note that federal reserved rights only extend to unappropriated water. Thus, no claim can
be made under the federal reserved rights doctrine to water which had already been
appropriated at the time the federal reservation was set aside.
48. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705-11; In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 97 (Wyo. 1988), a.ff'd mem. by an equally
divided Court, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
49. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141.8 (1995).
50. See, e.g., 753 P.2d at 97; Jesse, 744 P.2d at 494.
51. Frank J. Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PURC, 54 DENY. L. J.
473, 474 (1977). Trelease notes that "no case defines or explains" what water is "appurtenant."
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Arizona v. California I

In Arizona v. California 1, 52 the U.S. Supreme Court adjudicated
the rights of Arizona and California to the Colorado River. In addition,
the Court adjudicated the water rights of five Colorado River Indian
tribes to the river. The Court held that the measure of an Indian tribe's
reserved right is the amount of water necessary to irrigate all the
Basically, a
"practicably irrigable acreage" on its reservation. 53
determination of the number of practicably irrigable acres on an Indian
reservation must be made, and then that number is multiplied by a water
duty to arrive at the quantity of the tribe's reserved water right. The PIA
test constituted a drastic expansion of the federal reserved rights doctrine.
Arizona v. California I is the only case in which the U.S. Supreme
Court has quantified Indian reserved water rights. Yet only a single
paragraph in the 52-page opinion was devoted to the measure of Indian
reserved water rights. The Special Master had determined the irrigable
acreage on each reservation, but did not explain how such acreage was
to be determined. The Supreme Court simply held that the Master's
findings on the amount of irrigable acreage were "reasonable. " 54 The
Court also agreed with the Master's finding that "the water was intended
to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the Indian Reservations. " 55 The PIA standard was analyzed only by the Special Master,
whose decisions have no precedential value. 56 The Supreme Court has
not addressed the PIA standard in an opinion since its 1964 decree in
Arizona v. California I. 57
The Supreme Court additionally held that the federal reserved rights
doctrine applies not only to reservations created by treaty, but also to
reservations created by executive order and statute as well as to other
non-Indian federal reservations. 58 This in itself was a fundamental
expansion of the federal reserved right doctrine, which prior to Arizona
v. California I was thought to apply only to reservations created by
treaty.

52. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
53. /d. at 600. See also Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
54. Arizona v. California I, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1962).
55. /d. at 600.
56. Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d
1394, 1419 (9th Cir. 1983); Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 48.
57. Arizona v. California I, Decree, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
58. Arizona v. California I, 373 U.S. at 598-600. See also United States v. Walker
River Irrigation District, 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).

274

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 10

As a result of Arizona v. California /, the conflict for water between
state and federal users has been amplified. The PIA standard is a serious
threat to non-Indian water users because of the highly consumptive nature
of irrigation water use and because of the huge amount of Indian
reservation acreage in the western United States. 59 In Arizona alone,
the Western States Water Council has estimated that potential claims
based on the PIA standard for Arizona Indian reservations total eleven
times the total dependable surface water supply in the state. 60
The need to quantify federal reserved rights has been the driving
factor in adjudications commenced under the McCarran Amendment, 61
including Arizona's General Stream Adjudications. The parties that
brought the original petitions for the Arizona adjudications (Salt River
Project, ASARCO, and Phelps Dodge) did so in response to the federal
reserved rights doctrine. Under that doctrine, Indian water rights need
not be, and rarely have been quantified. Although the Indians were
entitled to water, they historically did not use much water, so non-Indians
proceeded to appropriate all available water supplies. While Indians'
claims lay dormant, the formation of western states' economies was made
possible by appropriation of this water. The western states and their
largest industries became concerned about these dormant Indian water
claims, so they began the process of adjudication to quantify those
claims.

B.
1.

Other Quantification Cases: Narrowing the Doctrine

Cappaert v. United States and the Minimal Need Requirement

After Arizona v. California I, the U.S. Supreme Court began to rein
in the federal reserved rights doctrine. The first such case was Cappaert
v. United States. 62 Cappaert involved the Devil's Hole Pupfish which
inhabits a pool located in the cavern of the Devil's Hole National
Monument, a federal reservation. 63 In order for the pupfish to spawn,
the level of the pool must be sufficient to submerge a rock shelf. 64 The
Cappaerts were nearby ranchers whose well water usage lowered the

59. In Arizona, for instance, about one-third of the entire state is Indian land. See
generally PETER W. SLY, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT MANUAL 104 (1988).
60. Indian Reserved Water Rights: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1984) (Western States Water Council, Report
to Western Governors).
61. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1995).
62. 426 u.s. 128 (1976).
63. /d. at 131.
64. /d. at 133-34.
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water level of the pool and thereby exposed the shelf. 65 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the executive proclamation which created the
Monument explicitly reserved a water right sufficient to protect the
pupfish. 66 Thus, Cappaert did not on its face involve federal reserved
rights, which are impliedly reserved upon creation of a federal reservation.
Although the Court stated that the water in the pool was surface
water, it recognized the direct hydrological connection between the pool
and the water pumped from the Cappaert's wells, and therefore enjoined
the Cappaert 's pumping only to the extent necessary to ensure a sufficient
pool of water for the pup fish to spawn. 67 The Court held that the
United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether
that diversion is of surface water or groundwater. 68 Importantly, the
Court did not go so far as to hold that a federal reserved right extends to
groundwater. Indeed, the Court observed that "[n]o cases of [the United
States Supreme] Court have applied the doctrine of implied reservation
of water rights to groundwater. " 69
Cappaert reaffirmed that "[t]he implied-reservation-of-water-rights
doctrine . . . reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purposes of the reservation, no more. " 70 Any attempt to reconcile
Cappaert with the earlier PIA test of Arizona v. California I must
recognize that Cappaert involved a non-Indian federal reservation,
whereas Arizona v. California I involved Indian reservations.

2.

United States v. New Mexico and the "Primary Purpose" Test

Though not involving Indian water rights, United States v. New
Mexico 71 further defined and limited the federal reserved rights doctrine.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that federal reservations have reserved
water rights only to the minimum amount of water necessary to effectuate
the primary purpose of the reservation - that amount without which the
purpose of the reservation would be "entirely defeated. " 72 Water for
secondary purposes must be acquired under state law, not under the
federal reserved rights doctrine. 73 The Supreme Court rejected claims
for reserved instream flow water rights, and held that the United States

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

!d. at 135.
!d. at 142.
!d. at 142-43.
!d. at 143.
!d. at 142.
!d. at 141 (citing Arizona v. California I, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963)).
438 U.S. 696 (1978).
!d. at 700-03.
!d. at 702.
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could not claim reserved water rights under the Organic AcC4 for
aesthetic, recreational, and wildlife purposes. 75
But New Mexico involved a national forest, not an Indian reservation. 76 A looming issue in western water law is the extent to which the
New Mexico primary/secondary purpose test will be applied to Indian
reservations. In Arizona, the Gila River Adjudication Court has held that
the primary/secondary purpose test applies to non-Indian federal
reservations, but not to Indian reservations. 77 That court refused to
inquire into the purpose of any particular Indian reservation, but instead
assumed that the purpose of all Indian reservations is agricultural and that
the measure of the Indian reserved right is the PIA standard. 78 Other
courts have reached a similar conclusion. 79
C.

Recognized Purposes of Indian Reservations

Because the issue of whether an Indian reservation may ever have
more than one purpose-or any non-agricultural purpose-has not been
finally resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, it is instructive to look at the
purposes of Indian reservations that have been recognized. In Arizona v.
California I, the Court agreed with the Master's finding that "the water
was intended to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the
Indian Reservations . . . . " 80 While the Supreme Court apparently
assumed that an award of PIA would satisfy "the future as well as the
present needs" of the Indians, it certainly left open the possibility that
water might be useful to the Indians for purposes other than irrigated
agriculture.

74. The Organic Administration Act of 1897, 16 U .S.C. § 418 (repealed Feb. 20, 1931,
ch. 235, 46 Stat. 1191). This statute formed the basis for creation of the national forest
system.
75. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707-08.
76. For another case dealing with national forests, see United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d
491 (Colo. 1987).
77. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System
and Source, Nos. W-1, W-2, W-3 and W-4 (consol.) (Maricopa Co. Super. Ct) (order made
on September 9, 1988, on file with the author).
78. /d. at 17. Whether the court erred in this respect is the subject of a pending
interlocutory appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.
79. See, e.g., In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System, 753 P.2d 76, 111 (Wyo. 1988) ("There is a strong indication that New Mexico
does not apply to Indian reserved water rights."), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 492
U.S. 406 (1989); Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 766-67
(Mont. 1985).
80. 373 U.S. at 599-600.
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Permanent homeland for irrigated agriculture

One long-recognized purpose of Indian reservations is to provide a
"permanent homeland" for Indian tribes and thus to transform their
members from nomadic hunters and gatherers into pastoral farmers by
establishing them in irrigated agriculture. The Winters case is the source
of the "permanent homeland" concept. 81 This concept was reaffirmed
in Arizona v. California I, where the Court simply stated that water was
reserved "to make the reservation livable. " 82 There the Court recognized that:
[m]ost of the land in these reservations is and always has been arid. If
the water necessary to sustain life is to be had, it must come from the
Colorado River or its tributaries. It can be said without overstatement
that when the Indians were put on these reservations they were not
considered to be located in the most desirable area of the Nation. It is
impossible to believe that when Congress created the great Colorado
River Indian Reservation and when the Executive Department of this
Nation created the other reservations they were unaware that most of
the lands were of the desert kind - hot, scorching sands - and that water
from the river would be essential to the life of the Indian people and to
the animals they hunted and the crops they raised. 83

Other cases have embraced the permanent homeland concept. 84
However, no court has enunciated a standard for quantifying water rights
reserved for the purpose of a permanent Indian homeland.

2.

Fishing, hunting, and gathering rights

Several cases have awarded federal reserved rights to Indian tribes
to preserve tribal fishery, hunting, and gathering rights. 85 Those tribal

81. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576. See supra text and accompanying
notes 5-10.
82. 373 U.S. at 599,/ollowed in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 n.15
(1981).
83. 373 U.S. at 598-99.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied
sub nom., Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-48 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). But see In
re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d
76 (Wyo. 1988) (treaty language establishing a "permanent home" for the Indians does not
create a federal reserved right), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
85. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968); Alaska
Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
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rights may also include the right to minimum instream flows. 86 For
example, in United States v. Adair, 87 the Ninth Circuit recognized
reserved rights in maintenance of flows necessary for fish runs under a
treaty that gave Indians the right to hunt and fish on reservation lands. 88
In Big Horn, by contrast, the court limited the federal reserved right to
agricultural purposes. 89

3.

Power generation

At least one court has awarded an Indian tribe a reserved right for
power generation purposes. 90

4.

Dual purposes

The Ninth Circuit has held that a particular Indian reservation can
have dual primary purposes. 91 Other courts disagree. 92 In Arizona v.
California I, the Court held that "the water was intended to satisfy the
future as well as the present needs of the Indian Reservations, "93 thus
seemingly acknowledging that water might be useful to the Indians for
more than one purpose. In the Arizona General Stream Adjudications,
for example, Indian tribes have made claims for water under the federal
reserved rights doctrine for many non-agricultural purposes, such as
municipal, industrial, hydropower generation, ranching, and other uses.

86. See, e.g., Joint Board of Control v. United States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988). United States V. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied sub nom., Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984). Cf United
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707-08 (1978) (rejecting claims for reserved instream
water rights for a national forest, and holding that the United States could not claim reserved
water rights under the Organic Act for aesthetic, recreational or wildlife purposes); In re Big
Horn River System, 753 P.2d at 98-99 (the United States could not, under the Organic Act,
claim reserved water rights for a national forest for instream flow, fisheries, aesthetic,
recreational or wildlife purposes); United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 500 (Colo. 1987)
(" [I]n contrast to the explicit legislative protections enacted by Congress and some states to
preserve lake levels and instream flows, the national forests were reserved for a very limited
purpose, which did not explicitly include the preservation of instream flows.").
87. 723 F.2d 1394.
88. /d. at 1410.
89. In re Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d at 98-99 (refusing to recognize reserved
rights in the United States for instream uses, fisheries, mineral development, aesthetic,
recreational or wildlife purposes).
90. United Statesv. Walker River Irrigation District, 104 F.2d 334, 340 (9th Cir. 1939).
91. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410.
92. In re Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d at 96 (holding that the sole purpose of the
Wind River Reservation was agricultural); In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Gila River System and Source, Nos. W-1, W-2, W-3 and W-4 (consol.)
(Maricopa Co. Super. Ct) (order made on September 9, 1988, on file with the author).
93. 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
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Change of use

The Ninth Circuit has held that once a tribe has a vested property
right in reserved water, it may use it in any lawful manner. 94 Subsequent acts making the historically intended use of the water unnecessary
do not divest the tribe of the water right. 95
A related issue in western water law is the extent to which an Indian
tribe can sell or lease excess water. Indians argue that they may sell or
lease water awarded to them under the PIA standard, while non-Indian
water users oppose this extension of the reserved rights doctrine. The
U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue.

D.

The Sensitivity Doctrine

The so-called "sensitivity doctrine" has arisen as one limit on federal
reserved rights. The source of the doctrine is found in United States v.
New Mexico 96 in language of the majority and concurring opinions. The
majority stated:
When, as in the case of the Rio Mimbres, a river is fully appropriated,
federal reserved water rights will frequently require a gallon-for-gallon
reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy state and
private appropriators. This reality has not escaped the attention of
Congress and must be weighed in determining what, if any, water
Congress reserved for use in the national forests. 97
In the concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated:
I agree with the court that the implied-reservation doctrine should be
applied with sensitivity to its impact upon those who have obtained
water rights under state law and to Congress' general policy of
deference to state water law. 98
The idea that their reserved rights must be quantified with "sensitivity" to state and private water users is anathema to the Indians, whose war
cry is "we got here first." The tribes are quick to point out that United
States v. New Mexico was a non-Indian federal reservation case, and
argue fervently that the sensitivity doctrine has no application to Indian
reservations. Yet in the absence of sensitivity, quantification of Indian

94. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48-49 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
95. /d.

96. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
97. /d. at 705.
98. /d. at 718.
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reserved rights will undoubtedly result in a massive reallocation of water
from non-Indian to Indian users. 99 In Big Horn, the Wyoming Supreme
Court noted that "[i]t is thus not clear whether the sensitivity doctrine,
requiring the quantification of reserved water rights with sensitivity to the
impact on state and private appropriators, applies [to Indian reserved
rights]." 100 But just in case it did, the court held that the Special
Master's analysis "evidences a sufficient sensitivity to the water needs of
other water users. " 101

E.

Applicability of Federal Reserved Rights to Groundwater

Indian tribes have argued that their federal reserved rights extend to
groundwater as well as to surface water. 102 This argument has two
aspects. The first aspect requires a determination of what water sources
are encompassed by the federal reserved rights doctrine. The second
aspect concerns enforcement of federal reserved rights against groundwater users. Both aspects have their roots in the question of what scientifically recognized hydrological connection between groundwater and
surface water should be legally recognized for enforcement purposes. In
other words, should an Indian tribe have the right to sue to enjoin a
groundwater withdrawal that may impact its federal reserved rights?
Again, this issue has not been resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.
In arguing that federal reserved rights extend to groundwater, the
Indian tribes rely primarily on Cappaert v. United States. 103 In
Cappaert, a non-Indian federal reservation case, the Court clearly stated
that the water in the pool inhabited by the pupfish was surface water.
However, it recognized the direct hydrological connection between the
pool and the water pumped from the Cappaert's wells, 104 and enjoined
the pumping only to the extent necessary to protect the fish's spawning
grounds. The Court held that the United States can protect its surface
water from subsequent diversion, whether that diversion is of surface
water or groundwater. 105 Clearly the Court did not hold that a federal
reserved right extends to groundwater. Indeed, the Court observed that

99. See supra part II.A. See generally Jennele M. O'Hair, Arizona Water Policy:
Challenges for the '90s, 26 ARIZ. ATT'Y 8, 33 (Apr. 1990).
100. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System,
753 P.2d 76, 111 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
101. !d. at 112.
102. See generally Ned L. Bork III, The Application of Federal Reserved Water Rights
to Groundwater in the Western States, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 781 (1983).
103. 426 U.S. 128 (1978). See supra part II.B.l. for a discussion of the facts in
Cappaert.
104. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 143.
105. !d.
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"[n]o cases of [the United States Supreme] Court have applied the
doctrine of implied reservation of water rights to groundwater." 106
The basis for the Indians' argument that their federally reserved
rights extend to groundwater is jurisprudentially weak. The Seminal
Indian reserved rights cases have involved surface water, not groundwater. Winters, for example, involved surface water flowing in the Milk
River. 107 Arizona v. California I involved five tribes' rights to surface
water flowing in the Colorado River and its tributaries. 108 Yet logic
would support a federal reserved right to groundwater in cases where that
is the only source of water available to a federal reservation. No court
has apparently dealt with this situation. Arguably, Congress would not
intentionally locate a tribe on a reservation without any source of water.
In the Big Horn case, where both surface water and groundwater were
available to satisfy tribal water demands, the Wyoming Supreme Court
specifically held that "the reserved water doctrine does not extend to
groundwater. " 109 In affirming by an equally divided vote, the U.S.
Supreme Court evidently approved the conclusionY 0
In the McCarran Amendment context, a recent decision of the Ninth
Circuit went against the Indians on this issue. In United States v.
Oregon, III the United States on behalf of the Klamath Tribe challenged
Oregon's general stream adjudication, claiming that it was not a
"comprehensive suit" as required by the McCarran Amendment. 112
The United States attacked the proceeding as non-comprehensive on the
basis, inter alia, that the adjudication did not determine rights to
groundwater. While acknowledging a growing trend to recognize the
hydrological connection between groundwater and surface water, the
court held that this trend was "too recent and too incomplete" to require
adjudication of groundwater rights as well as rights to surface water for
a state adjudication to meet the McCarran Amendment's comprehensiveness requirement. 113 Referring to the McCarran Amendment's use of
the phrase "river system or other source, " 114 the court stated that the
use of this disjunctive "strongly suggests" that a valid adjudication may
be limited to either a river system or some other source of water, "like

106. /d. at 142.
107. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908).
108. 373 U.S. at 598-99.
109. In Re Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d at 100, aff'd mem. by an equally divided
Court, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
110. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
111. 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994).
112. See supra note 20 for an explanation of the comprehensiveness requirement.
113. 44 F.3d at 770.
114. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1995).
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groundwater, but need not cover both. " 115 Thus, failure to include
groundwater in a general stream adjudication does not impair the
comprehensiveness of the adjudication so as to divest the state court of
McCarran Amendment jurisdiction. In this case, the Indians lost two
important battles: to have their rights to groundwater adjudicated, and to
secure a basis for enforcement of their federal reserved rights against
groundwater users.
But in the Arizona General Stream Adjudication, the trial court,
relying on Cappaert, has held that the federal reserved rights doctrine
extends to groundwater. 116 The issue of whether water that is considered non-appropriable groundwater under Arizona law may be subject to
a federal reserved rights claim is now before the Arizona Supreme Court
on interlocutory appeal. 117 The related enforcement issue - whether
holders of federal reserved water rights enjoy greater protections from
groundwater pumping than do holders of state water rights - is also
before the Arizona Supreme Court. 118 The briefs have been filed, but
the Arizona Supreme Court has deferred oral arguments pending its
decision on the constitutionality of recent amendments to the Arizona
adjudication statute. 119 The outcome of these appeals is of momentous
importance to Arizona and other western states.

115. 44 F.3d at 768.
116. In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System
and Source, Nos. W-1, W-2, W-3 and W-4 (consol.) (Maricopa Co. Super. Ct) (order made
on September 9, 1988, on file with the author). The trial court held that "federal reserved
water rights apply to both surface water and groundwater sources on and off the reservation
whose diversion affects reservation sources, to the extent that there is not enough water left to
satisfy the reservation's purpose, or P.I.A. if the land is an Indian reservation." /d. at 20
(emphasis added). With this language, the court extended the "appurtenancy" element of the
federal reserved rights doctrine to its logical limits, and may have gone so far as to give a
federal reservation a right to recharge of its surface water supply. See Trelease, supra note
51 and accompanying text.
The Arizona Supreme Court has also recognized the hydrological connection between
groundwater and surface water. In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
in the Gila River System and Source, 857 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. 1993) (en bane) (rejecting the trial
court's "50%-90 day" test of subflow).
117. This issue has been designated as Interlocutory Appeal Issue No. 4.
118. This issue has been designated as Interlocutory Appeal Issue No. 5.
119. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-14l.C (1995); H.B. 2276, 42d Legis., 1st Reg. Sess.,
Ch. 9, Sec. 3 (1995) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-14l.C).
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Other Limitations on Federal Reserved Rights

Required deference to state water law

As noted above, 120 the courts, in finding that the establishment of
Indian and other federal reservations included reserved rights to water,
have used several different terms to describe the nature and source of
these rights. The Winters case referred to "implications" and "inferences" as the means by which the Court found that the federal government
had reserved rights to the Milk River on behalf of the Fort Belknap
Indian Reservation. 121 Other decisions have grounded the "implied" or
"inferred" water rights in the presumed intent of Congress or the
Executive in creating the reservations for which the water rights were
claimed. 122
Arguably, the scope and extent of an "inferred" or "implied"
reservation of water rights may only be understood in the larger context
of the federal government's dealings with the public lands that made up
the territories and states at the time the rights were impliedly reserved.
These dealings demonstrate the federal government's general policy of
deference to state laws governing water and property rights. Under this
argument, federal reserved rights may under proper circumstances be
limited by the attributes or conditions placed on state water rights .123
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions indicate "a retreat from the
Supreme Court's prior broad interpretations of the reserved water rights
doctrine. " 124 The Supreme Court has restricted, not expanded, the
reserved rights doctrine, permitting its use only to secure the amount of
water absolutely necessary to meet the primary-but not the secondary-purposes of the reservation. 125 A reserved right will be implied

120. See supra part I. C.
121. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
122. See, e.g., Arizona v. California I, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963); United States v.
Walker River Irrigation District, 104 F.2d 334, 339-40 (9th Cir. 1939); Skeem v. United
States, 273 F. 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1921).
123. For instance, in their briefs on Interlocutory Issues 4 and 5, Arizona groundwater
users have argued that percolating groundwater, which is non-appropriable under Arizona law,
must be excluded from the water to which federal reserved rights attach. See supra notes I 16118 and accompanying text.
124. Star L. Waring & KirkS. Samelson, Non-Indian Federal Reserved Water Rights, 58
DENY. U. L. REV. 783,786 (1981). See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 12931 (1983); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653-70 (1978); United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699-701 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1978);
Alan E. Boles, Jr. & Charles M. Elliott, United States Versus New Mexico and the Course of
Federal Reserved Water Rights, 51 U. Cow. L. REV. 209 (1980).
125. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702; Nevada v. United States,
463 U.S. at 134.
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only if "the purpose of the reservation would be entirely defeated"
without it. 126 These cases show that the Supreme Court is moving
toward defining the reserved rights doctrine in a manner that is compatible with state law. Further expansion of the doctrine goes against the
principles of deference to state law and narrow implication of reserved
rights. Indeed, Cappaert's refusal to extend the reserved rights doctrine
to groundwater is not surprising when viewed in the context of Congress'
historic deference to state water law.

2.

Prior water rights decrees

Federal reserved rights have sometimes been quantified in previous
state and federal court water rights adjudications. 127 Indian tribes argue
that they are not bound by the amounts decreed in these previous
adjudications. Non-Indian water users, on the other hand, contend that
these prior decrees are res judicata as to the quantity of the reserved
right.
Important support for the non-Indian viewpoint was provided by
Arizona v. California III, 128 in which the U.S. Supreme Court refused
to reopen the decree in Arizona v. California I at the behest of the
Colorado River Indian tribes, who argued that they had been shortchanged on their federal reserved rights. The Court based its refusal to
reopen the decree on principles of finality and stare decisis, which it said
are especially important in the area of water and property rights. 129
Noting that its 1964 decree had generated significant expectations,
reliance and investment on the part of non-Indian water users, the Court
denied the Indians' request to reopen the decree. 130

3.

Endangered Species Act implications

The Endangered Species Act 131 may also operate as a limitation on
federal reserved rights. To the extent that a threatened or endangered
species may require water to which an Indian or non-Indian federal
reservation is entitled, the federal reservation may be prohibited from

126. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700.
127. In Arizona, for instance, the Kent Decree adjudicated the rights of the Salt River
Pima-Maricopa and the Fort McDowell Indian Communities; and the Globe Equity No. 59
Decree adjudicated the rights of the San Carlos Apache Tribe and the Gila River Indian
Community.
128. 460 U.S. 605 (1982).
129. !d. at 619-20.
130. !d. at 620-21. See also, United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758,768 (9th Cir. 1939)
("the comprehensiveness standard requires the consolidation of existing controversies, not the
reopening of settled determinations.")
131. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1514 (1994).
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using that water. 132 The same threat is posed to non-Indian water users
claiming water rights based on state law. 133 The U.S. Supreme Court
has not yet spoken on this issue.

4.

The just compensation clause

Finally, the just compensation clauses of the United States and state
constitutions may operate as a limitation on federal reserved rights. 134
This possible limitation is supported by various public land and water
studies commissioned by the federal government which express great
concern regarding the ambiguity and scope of the reserved rights
doctrine.
One such study is the 1970 report by the Public Land Law Review
Commission (PLLRC). In the report the PLLRC observed that:
when reliance is placed on Federal water rights impliedly reserved along
with the reservation or withdrawal of public lands, the effect may be to
displace, without compensation, other non-Federal public and private
uses under water rights acquired under state law subsequent to the date
when the water was impliedly reserved for the Federal lands, but prior
to the date the water was actually put to use by the Federal agencies. I3s

The PLLRC noted that prior to the Supreme Court's 1963 Arizona v.
California I decision:

132. See, e.g., Proposed Rule to List the Huachuca Water Umbel, Canelo Hills Ladies'tresses and Sonora Tiger Salamander as Endangered Species, 60 Fed. Reg. 16836, 16840-41
(Apr. 3, 1995) (Fish and Wildlife Service determination that these species could be jeopardized
by surface water diversion and impoundment and groundwater pumping by Fort Huachuca
Military Reservation); Proposed Endangered Status for the Plant Puccinellia Parishii, 59 Fed.
Reg. 14378, 14380 (Mar. 28, 1994) (Fish and Wildlife Service determination that plant could
be jeopardized by surface water diversion and impoundment and groundwater pumping);
SECTION 7 CONSULTATION BIOLOGICAL OPINION AND CONFERENCE REPORT FOR NAVAJO
INDIAN IRRIGATION PROJECT, Blocks 1-8, at 2 (Oct. 28, 1991) (United States Fish and Wildlife
Service determination that the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project will jeopardize the Colorado
squawfish by depletion of flows in the San Juan River).
133. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134
(E.D.Cal. 1992) (state water rights do not prevail over Endangered Species Act restrictions);
FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE TRANSPORTATION AND DELIVERY OF CENTRAL ARIZONA
PROJECT WATER TO THE GILA RIVER BASIN (Apr. 1994) (Fish and Wildlife Service
determination that continued Central Arizona Project water deliveries to central Arizona
jeopardize threatened or endangered fish species in the upper Gila River basin and adversely
modify critical habitat).
134. See generally, Charles E. Corker, Let There Be No Nagging Doubts: Nor Shall
Private Property, Including Water Rights, Be Taken For Public Use Without Just Compensation, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 109 (1970).
135. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 149 (1970).
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no water user could have been on actual or constructive notice of the
existence of such an 'implied' Federal water right. The same is true of
the state administrative agencies, since as a matter of formal policy and
actual practice, the [federal] public land agencies generally adhered to
state law in acquiring water rights for reserved lands before 1963 .136
Given these compensation concerns, the PLLRC report recommended
compensation for state water users whose water rights vested before
Arizona v. California I and would be damaged by the exercise of reserved
rights. 137
These considerations were echoed by the National Water Commission
in 1973. It observed that "the Federal Government led the way in
developing the West for non-Indian beneficiaries, and if private investors
and State and local governments followed, the protection afforded Federal
beneficiaries should be accorded to the others. " 138 Like the PLLRC,
the National Water Commission recommended compensation for holders
of state water rights injured by the exercise of Indian reserved rights. 139
Professor Trelease has strongly advocated that "the social costs of
displacing existing uses for the benefit of national programs should be
borne by federal taxpayers, and not by the affected individual users. " 140
In his view, the courts, "should call for federal insistence on federal law
when national considerations require it, but permit federal accommodation of state interests where federal objectives are not sacrificed, and
federal adjustments to state needs where state interests outweigh federal
advantages." 141 Because non-Indian water users face divestment of their
water rights as a result of the federal reserved rights doctrine, it seems
fair that they should receive some kind of compensation for their
displaced property rights.

136. /d.
137. /d.
138. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION,

WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 481 (1973).

139. See also,

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CON-

GRESS-RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A GROWING

26-28 (1978).
140. Frank J. Trelease, Water Resources on the Public Lands: PLLRC's Solution to the
ReservationDoctrine, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 89, 99 (1970).
141. /d. at 106.
CONTROVERSY IN NEED OF RESOLUTION
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RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PIA STANDARD

Justice O'Connor's Unpublished Opinion in Big Horn:
A New PIA Standard

One of the looming issues surrounding quantification of Indian
reserved water rights is the extent to which economic feasibility will be
considered in applying the PIA standard. On this point, an unpublished
opinion by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor may shed
some light on the ultimate fate of this question in the U.S. Supreme
Court.
The decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court in the Wyoming Big
Horn Adjudication 142 was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
affirmed the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision by an equally divided
vote. 143
Justice O'Connor authored an opinion for a majority of the Court
which was never published because she later withdrew from consideration
of the case. Her opinion would have reversed and vacated that portion
of the Wyoming Supreme Court's opinion which included a PIA
calculation for "future lands. " 144
Justice O'Connor began by noting that the Wind River Reservation
presently consists of 2.5 million acres located in a fertile river valley
which is the choicest and best-watered portion of Wyoming. 145 This
perspective, highlighted at the beginning of the draft unpublished opinion,
did not bode well for the Indian tribe.
In 1977, Wyoming initiated a general adjudication in its state courts
to determine all rights in the Big Horn River system. The adjudication
was divided into three phases, with the first phase focusing on Indian
reserved rights. The district court appointed Special Master Teno
Roncalio to recommend a decree on the Indians' entitlement to water. 146
The Special Master found that the United States, through a 1868
treaty with the tribe, impliedly reserved enough water to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation, which was to create a permanent homeland
for the tribes. He found that Congress had impliedly reserved water for
many purposes, including agriculture, livestock, fish and wildlife,
142. In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 492 U.S. 406
(1989).
143. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
144. Draft Unpublished Majority Opinion in Wyoming v. United States (June 1989)
(O'Connor, J.) (on file with the author).
145. /d. at 2.
146. /d.
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mining, and municipal and industrial use. However, the Master found
that the reserved right did not extend to groundwater.
In quantifying the agricultural entitlement, he used the PIA standard
of Arizona v. California I. In doing so, he created two classes of lands:
historic lands and future lands. 147
Reservation lands that had historically been irrigated or were
currently being irrigated were called "historic lands" These the Master
found to be practicably irrigable if they were arable, and no benefit-cost
analysis was conducted for these lands. 148
Reservation lands that had never been irrigated, but were capable of
irrigation if new irrigation projects were completed in the future were
called "future lands." To these lands, the Master applied a three-prong
test to determine practicable irrigability. The test requires that: (1) the
lands are arable (a scientific inquiry); (2) the proposed irrigation projects
are feasible (an engineering inquiry); and (3) the lands can be cultivated
at a reasonable cost (an economic inquiry). This last factor was
essentially a cost-benefit analysis which took into account the expected
profit from and cost of the irrigation projects .149
The state district court accepted most of the Master's recommendations, but held that the sole purpose of the reservation was agricultural,
and refused to award reserved rights for non-agricultural uses. 150
The Wyoming Supreme Court largely affirmed. 151 It agreed with
the district court that the sole purpose of the reservation was agricultural. 152 It also agreed that the reserved right does not extend to groundwater.153 With regard to the quantification of PIA for "historic lands,"
the court agreed that the Master had properly applied a presumption of
practical irrigability. 154 As to "future lands," the court held that the
determination of PIA required consideration of whether the land is
susceptible to sustained irrigation (not only proof of arability but also of
the engineering feasibility of irrigation), and whether the land is irrigable
at a reasonable cost. 155 Thus, the Wyoming Supreme Court accepted
the Special Master's three-prong test for future lands.

147. !d.
148. !d. at 2-3.
149. !d. at 3.
150. !d.
151. In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 492 U.S. 406
(1989).
152. !d. at 97.
153. !d. at 99.
154. !d. at 107.
155. !d. at 101.
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Based on the Master's analysis, the court quantified the tribe's
reserved right at 501 ,000 acre feet per year, based on 54,000 acres of
historic lands and 54,000 acres of future lands. 156 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Wyoming Supreme
Court correctly quantified the tribe's reserved surface water rights.
Had Justice O'Connor not recused herself, the Supreme Court would
have held that the PIA standard was not intended to be the sole method
for quantifying Indian reserved water rights. 157 The standard of
quantification, she said, depends in each case on the purpose of the
particular reservation in issue. 158 Arizona v. California I did not, after
all, express any view on the calculation of reserved rights for reservations
whose purposes are non-agricultural. 159
Justice O'Connor also noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has never
determined the specific attributes of federal reserved rights, such as
whether such rights are subject to forfeiture for nonuse or whether they
may be sold or leased for use on or off the reservation. 160 If this view
prevails in the next big PIA case, the Court could, if it wishes, "write on
a clean slate" and redefine PIA.
While noting that the PIA standard is "not without defects," Justice
O'Connor would have "decline[d] Wyoming's invitation to discard the
PIA standard. " 161 She would have affirmed the use of the PIA standard
on the basis that "it provides some measure of predictability," because it
has generated "significant expectations, reliance and investment," and
because no other standard had been suggested which would prove as
workable for determining reserved rights for agricultural reservations. 162
Justice O'Connor would have agreed with the Wyoming Supreme
Court "that arable lands which have been or are currently being irrigated
should generally be considered practically irrigable. " 163 Thus, she
agreed with the Wyoming Supreme Court's PIA analysis for "historic
lands."
As for "future lands," however, Justice O'Connor departed from the
Wyoming court's analysis. The O'Connor opinion would have held that
the three "future lands" factors identified by the Wyoming Supreme

156. Id. at 106 (discussing historic lands); /d. at 100-06 (discussing future lands).
157. Draft Unpublished Majority Opinion in Wyoming v. United States at 10 (June 1989)
(O'Connor, J.) (on file with the author).
158. Id.
159. /d.
160. /d. at 12.
161. /d.
162. ld.
163. /d. at 13.

290

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 10

Court are necessary but insufficient for the PIA determination. In
addition, she said, quantification of reserved rights must entail sensitivity
to the impact on state and private appropriators of scarce water under
state law. 164 For this proposition, she cited United States v. New
Mexico and Cappaert v. United States, both non-Indian reserved rights
cases. 165 Thus, Justice O'Connor had no difficulty extending the
sensitivity doctrine to the Wind River Indian Reservation.
Justice O'Connor did not go so far as to argue that "future lands" are
never entitled to a PIA quantification. But she would have remanded to
the Wyoming court for recalculation of the amount of PIA for "future
lands." In remanding for recalculation on this issue, Justice O'Connor
stated:
The inclusion in the PIA quantification of arable lands not yet irrigated
depends on the assumption that necessary future irrigation projects will
be built to supply water to those lands. . . . Given that "federal
reserved water rights will frequently require a gallon-for-gallon
reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy state and
private appropriators," New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705, the existence of
future projects can not be taken for granted. Sensitivity to the impact
on prior appropriators necessarily means that "there has to be some
degree of pragmatism" in determining PIA. 753 P.2d at 119 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). We think this pragmatism involves a "practical"
assessment - a determination apart from theoretical economic and
engineering feasibility of the reasonable likelihood that future irrigation
projects, necessary to enable lands which have never been irrigated to
obtain water, will actually be built. 166

This "reasonable likelihood" test would have constituted a drastic
contraction of the PIA doctrine, especially since the federal government
has no duty to develop irrigation facilities for tribes nor to construct
facilities with federal funds. 167
In her opinion Justice O'Connor also stated that in determining PIA,
the finder of fact should examine the evidence showing additional
cultivated acreage is needed "to supply food or fibre to resident tribal
members, or to meet the realistic needs of tribal members to expand their
existing farming operations." 168 The fact finder should determine

164. /d. at 15 (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705 (1978). See supra
part II.D. for a discussion of the sensitivity doctrine.
165. /d.
166. /d. at 16-17.
167. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 11 Ct. CJ. 614 (1987).
168. Draft Unpublished Majority Opinion in Wyoming v. United States at 18 (June 1989)
(O'Connor, J .).
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whether there would be a sufficient market for or economically productive use of the crops that would be grown on the additional acreage. 169
Thus, in Justice O'Connor's view, PIA should not be awarded for
additional irrigation that either is not necessary to meet "the realistic
needs" of Indians living on their reservation or that would produce only
a marginal economic return for the tribe. These limitations, coupled with
the "reasonable likelihood" test, would have radically narrowed the
federal reserved rights doctrine.
In their draft unpublished dissent, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun vehemently opposed the "reasonable likelihood" standard
suggested by Justice O'Connor, arguing that standard would penalize the
Indians for the lack of federal government investment on their reservations. This dissent stated that "[r]eliance on what the Government
chooses to spend on Indian water projects is no way to determine the
extent of rights that flow from an 1868 treaty. " 170 Brennan pointed out
that the three-prong test identified by Special Master Roncalio is identical
to that used by the Bureau of Reclamation in planning non-Indian
irrigation projects. If anything, he argued, the standard for planning
Indian irrigation projects should be broader-not narrower-than the
Reclamation standard since the Indians have a limited land base for
irrigation projects. 171
The dissenting opinion also objected to application of the sensitivity
doctrine 172 to Indian reserved rights. They criticized Justice O'Connor's failure to specify how to determine the "reasonable likelihood" that
future irrigation projects will be built, or the time frame for that inquiry.
Justice Brennan stated:
Is "reasonable likelihood" to be determined on the basis of objective
economic criteria? Or is it to depend on whether or not the Indians
have sufficient political support in Congress to assure a reasonable
likelihood that the project will be built? If the latter, the Court's
requirement of a "reasonable likelihood" that an irrigation project will
be built may well, in this domain of logrolling and the porkbarrel, give
the acronym PIA a new meaning: politically irrigable acreage. 173

Justice Brennan angrily continued:

169. !d.
170. Draft Unpublished Dissenting Opinion in Wyoming v. United States at 1 (June 1989)
(Brennan, J.) (on file with the author).
171. !d. at 4.
172. See discussion supra part II.D.
173. Draft Unpublished Dissenting Opinion in Wyoming v. United States at 5 (June 1989)
(Brennan, J.).
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The Court thus cuts loose the quantification of Indian water rights from
their moorings in congressional or Executive intent and makes them
subject to an equitable weighing of needs. . . . Today's decision ...
strikes at the heart of the Winters right itself. 174
The dissent also accused the majority of confusing the issue of quantification with the issue of the use of the water awarded:
The Court purports not to decide that question [whether Indian reserved
rights may be sold or leased for export off the reservation], but in fact
it has assumed the answer all along. If the Tribes were free to export
water they did not immediately need for agricultural purposes, then the
Court's premise that they had been awarded more water than they could
use would be clearly untenable .... I do not agree with the Court that
the question whether the Tribes will likely be able to use their reserved
rights for irrigation any time soon is relevant to the question of how
extensive those rights are. 175
As a final rebuke, Justice Brennan stated:
[I]f the Court now thinks that our prior assessment of what the
Government intended in creating the Indian reservations was wrong,
then let it say so frankly and overrule Arizona or even Winters. If not,
then let us stick to them even if it means the Indians get more water
than we think they "need." 176
With O'Connor's recusal, the evenly-divided U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the Wyoming Supreme Court in a memorandum decision. 177
As a result, the "reasonable likelihood" standard failed to become part of
PIA determinations.
Of the Justices who were on the bench when these opinions were
written, Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Stevens, and Kennedy remain. Justice White, who wrote the only
draft concurring opinion, is no longer on the bench. Of the three
dissenters (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun), none remain on the
Supreme Court. It remains uncertain how the new Justices will view this
issue, though there is a definite possibility that the "reasonable likelihood" standard will resurface in the next big PIA case.

174.
175.
176.
177.

!d. at 10.
!d. at20.
!d. at 23.
Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
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Recent Arizona PIA Ruling

Currently Arizona has two comprehensive stream adjudications
underway to determine rights to the use of water in most of the state. 178
The first had its initial decision in 1988, when the Gila River Adjudication Court adopted the PIA standard for all Indian reservations, relying
on Arizona v. California I. 179 The court refused to inquire into the
purpose of any particular Indian reservation and how much water is
necessary to satisfy that purpose, but instead assumed that the purpose of
all Indian reservations is agricultural and that the measure of the water
right is PIA. That ruling is now on interlocutory appeal to the Arizona
Supreme Court. 180 The appeal has not yet been scheduled for briefing,
and it may be years before a final decision is rendered by the highest
state court. Whatever that decision is, it will undoubtedly be appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court. Because of the huge PIA claims made by
Indian tribes in Arizona, 181 the outcome of that appeal is critical, and
may have a significant impact on the economic and political future of
Arizona.
In the second pending Arizona stream adjudication, the new Gila
River Adjudication judge 182 granted the Gila River Indian Community's
motion to order the Arizona Department of Water Resources to proceed
with the Gila River Indian Reservation hydrographic survey report 183
so that its claimed senior water rights may be adjudicated. 184 In this
August 1995 opinion, the court commented on PIA.
Judge Bolton concluded that "the general stream adjudication for the
Gila River System and Source will be best served by commencing the

178. In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System
and Source, Nos. W-1, W-2, W-3 and W-4 (consoi.)(MaricopaCo. Super. Ct.)(on file with
the author); In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Little Colorado
River System and Source, No. 6417 (Apache Co. Super. Ct.)( on file with the author).
179. In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System
and Source Nos. W-1, W-2, W-3, and W-4 (consoi.)(MaricopaCo. Super. Ct. 1988)(unpublished order, on tile with the author).
180. The issue of whether the court correctly adopted the PIA standard is designated as
Interlocutory Issue No. 3.
181. See generally part II.
182. The Honorable Susan Bolton recently took over the Gila River Adjudication from
retiring Judge Stanley Goodfarb.
183. The hydrographic survey report is the report prepared by the Arizona Department
of Water Resources to initiate adjudication of a claimant's water rights. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-256 (1995).
184. In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System
and Source, Maricopa County Superior Court Nos. W-1, W-2, W-3 and W-4 (consol.) (Minute
Entry Order of August 31, 1995, on file with the author).
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determination of the [Gila River Indian Community] rights at this
time." 185 Despite the fact that the issue of whether PIA is the exclusive
measure of Indian reserved rights is currently on interlocutory appeal to
the Arizona Supreme Court, Judge Bolton directed that the best starting
point for determination of the Community's rights is a "technical analysis
of the possible extent of federal reserved rights based upon practicably
irrigable acreage (PIA). " 186 However, she directed that if the Community claims other types of potential water uses which would require the
use of standards other than PIA, the Department of Water Resources
("DWR") should examine and report on these uses to make a complete
record. 187
The court directed that in assessing PIA, DWR should review
existing proposals for agricultural development, and use existing materials
to arrive at an independent technical assessment of PIA on the reservation.188 Only if DWR determines that this information is insufficient
should it supplement existing studies with its own investigations on the
reservation. 189
Judge Bolton instructed DWR that it need not address all factors
necessary for a final PIA determination. These factors, she noted, could
involve "many specific and controversial technical elements such as
irrigation system design, discount rate assumptions, and market returns
from crop production. " 190 Instead of focusing on these factors, the
Judge directed that DWR should concentrate on the "physical factors"
involved in PIA, "such as water supply and land arability, " 191 The
court specifically ruled that:
[i]n making this request for an assessment of PIA, the court is not
finding that PIA is the exclusive standard for the quantification of the
[Community's] rights. The court is merely concluding that PIA is a
relevant inquiry in the overall determination of the [Community's]
rights, and is an appropriate starting point for the final determination of
those rights. 192

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

ld. at 1.
ld.
ld. at 3.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 4.
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In this way, Judge Bolton avoided any appearance of interference with the
interlocutory appeal on the PIA issue currently pending before the
Arizona Supreme Court. 193
In confining DWR to a review of "existing proposals" for agricultural development, and requiring a showing of "the general likelihood" of
additional successful agricultural development, Judge Bolton has
effectively narrowed the PIA doctrine. Indeed, these limitations are
reminiscent of the "reasonable likelihood" test proposed by Justice
O'Connor in her draft unpublished majority opinion in Big Horn. 194
IV.

REMAINING UNRESOLVED PIA ISSUES

As Judge Bolton acknowledged in her August 31, 1995 Order, 195
many other issues related to feasibility or practicability of Indian
agriculture remain to be decided. Some of these are set forth below:
1. What are the standards of arability? Should the PIA standard be
applied differently to fertile versus barren reservations? Does PIA
include all arable acreage, or must a water supply be physically available
to it?
2. What level of irrigation efficiency should be required of Indian
agriculture? Should the same standard be applied to Indian and nonIndian agriculture?
3. What discount rate applies in determining economic feasibility? The
lower the discount rate, the better an investment in an irrigation system
will appear. 196
4. Should the determination of the amount of PIA be based on today's
agricultural technology, or on the technology existing at the time a
reservation was established? While the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet
considered this issue, the Special Master in the Big Horn adjudication did
consider it. He decided to base the PIA determination of engineering
feasibility on the technology existing at the time of trial. 197 Such a
view could lead to a lower water allocation for the Indians, since as
irrigation systems have become more sophisticated, they require less water.

193. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
194. See supra part liLA.
195. See, In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
System and Source, Maricopa County Superior Court Nos. W-1, W-2, W-3 and W-4 (consol.)
(Minute Entry Order of August 31, 1995, on file with the author).
196. SLY, supra note 59, at 99.
197. In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76, 102-03 (Wyo. 1988), affd mem. by an equally divided Court, 492 U.S.
406 (1989). See also, Arizona v. California III, 460 U.S. 605, 625 n.18 (1983); SLY, supra
note 59, at 102.
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5. Should an Indian tribe be required to demonstrate the ability to obtain
funding from Congress for a project that meets the court's standards? 198
6. What guidelines should be used for the required cost-benefit analysis?
In State Ex Rei. Martinez v. Lewis, 199 the New Mexico Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's PIA analysis as supported by substantial
evidence. 200 The tribe's arguments that the trial court improperly relied
on federal guidelines for cost-benefit analysis of irrigation projects and
used an improper discount rate were rejected. 201
7. May Indian reserved rights be sold or leased for export off the
reservation? Or does the appurtenancy element of the reserved rights
doctrine limit their use to on-reservation purposes?
The answers to these and other questions must be decided by the
courts-or legislated by Congress-in order for water users to attain some
level of security about their water rights.
In answering all of these questions it is important to remember that
the scope of the federal reserved rights doctrine is a question of federal
law. All questions regarding the volume and scope of reserved rights
"are federal questions which, if preserved, can be reviewed [by the
federal courts] after final judgment by the [state] court. " 202
V.

CONCLUSION

The foundations of the federal reserved rights doctrine were laid in
Winters v. United States, Cappaert v. United States, and Arizona v.
California I. Winters has come to stand for the broad proposition that the
federal government, in establishing federal reservations, impliedly
reserved sufficient water to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.
Winters was an injunctive action in which the Court merely affirmed a
decree enjoining the non-Indian upstream diverters from interfering with
the Indians' use of a relatively small amount of surface water. Thus, the
actual holding of Winters was quite narrow.
Cappaert was also an injunctive action. There the Court recognized
the hydrological connection between the pool inhabited by the pupfish and
the water pumped from the Cappaert's wells and enjoined their pumping
only to the extent necessary to ensure a sufficient amount of water for the
pupfish to spawn. The Court specifically stated that the water in the pool
was surface water, and clearly did not hold that a federal reserved right
extends to groundwater. Cappaert simply enforced a federal reserved

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
861 P.2d 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 858 P.2d 85 (N.M. 1993).
861 P.2d at 248.
/d. at 248-50.
United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 1994).
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right to the minimum amount of water necessary to fulfill the essential
purpose of the reservation.
Arizona v. California /-the only case in which the U.S. Supreme
Court has quantified Indian reserved water rights-affirmed the Special
Master's PIA standard of quantification. Only a single paragraph in the
52-page opinion was devoted to the measure of Indian reserved water
rights. The PIA standard was analyzed only by a Special Master, who
did not explain how such acreage was to be determined. The Supreme
Court simply upheld the Master's findings on the amount of PIA as
reasonable. Since its 1964 decision, the Supreme Court has not
addressed the PIA standard in an opinion.
Throughout the West, Indian tribes rely on these cases to support
their substantial claims to both surface water and groundwater based on
PIA. But these are "thin reeds" indeed on which to base such claims.
If these claims succeed, the result will be a massive reallocation of water
from non-Indian to Indian uses and the wholesale destruction of western
states' economies. At the root of the conflict is the federal government's conflicting promises to the homesteaders and the Indians. At the
same time that the federal government promised the Indians a permanent
homeland in exchange for cession of their vast aboriginal territories, it
promised the homesteaders that if they settled the West and invested in
water development, they could acquire vested water rights under state
water law systems promising to defer to those state law systems.
Through Winters, these conflicting promises were resolved in favor of the
Indians. In 1908, with plenty of water still remaining unappropriated, it
didn't matter very much. Even in 1963, when Arizona v. California I
was decided, there was still enough water to go around. Today,
however, when most western river systems are fully appropriated or
overappropriated, it matters a great deal. In the next important federal
reserved rights case to reach the Supreme Court, these conflicting federal
promises may well be resolved in favor of non-Indians.
An extensive jurisprudential basis exists for halting further expansion
of the federal reserved rights doctrine. Indeed, recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions have restricted the doctrine. The Supreme Court appears
to be defining the reserved rights doctrine in a manner which is
compatible with state law. Further expansion of the doctrine goes against
this recent trend of deference to state law and narrow implication of
reserved rights.
In actuality, there are several limitations or potential limitations on
the scope of the reserved rights doctrine. First, under the primary
purpose test, reserved rights may be awarded to satisfy only the primary
purpose of a reservation. Water for secondary purposes must be acquired
under state law, not under the federal reserved rights doctrine. The
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documents creating each reservation must be scrutinized to determine its
primary purpose. It is quite probable that many Indian reservations were
created for primary purposes other than agriculture. In such cases, the
PIA standard should have no application.
The primary purpose test also limits the amount of a reserved right
to that amount of water reasonably necessary to fulfill the primary
purpose of the reservation -that amount without which the purpose of
the reservation would be entirely defeated.
Second, federal reserved rights only extend to previously unappropriated water. Thus, no valid claim can be made under the reserved rights
doctrine to water which had already been appropriated by someone else
at the time the federal reservation was established. Furthermore, the
classic statement of the doctrine limits the reserved right to water
appurtenant to the federal reservation.
Third, recent cases have held that the reserved rights doctrine does
not extend to groundwater. There is no need to award a groundwater
right to a tribe that has access to sufficient surface water sources.
Groundwater pumping that interferes with a federal reserved surface
water right can be enjoined under the principles of Cappaert.
Fourth, the sensitivity doctrine requires that a federal reserved right
be quantified with sensitivity to its impact upon those who have obtained
water rights under state law and to Congress' general policy of deference
to state water law. This judicial gloss on the reserved rights doctrine
recognizes that in cases where a river is fully appropriated, an award of
federal reserved rights will require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the
amount of water available for state and private appropriators.
Fifth, principles of finality, stare decisis, collateral estoppel and res
judicata may prevent the reopening of prior reserved rights decrees and
the relitigation of prior reserved rights controversies. Because water
rights are property rights, such prior decrees have generated significant
expectations, reliance and investment on the part of non-Indian water
users. This limitation may become important in states where federal
reserved rights have already been decreed.
Sixth, the historic federal policy of deference to state laws governing
water and property rights may require that reserved rights be limited by
the attributes or conditions placed on state water rights. Such attributes
or conditions include the requirement of beneficial use, penalties for
forfeiture and abandonment, the appurtenancy doctrine, and other
elements of the prior appropriation doctrine.
Seventh, the Endangered Species Act may limit a reserved water
right. To the extent that a threatened or endangered species may require
water to which an Indian or non-Indian federal reservation is entitled, the
federal reservation may be prohibited from using that water.
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Eighth, the just compensation clauses of the federal and state
constitutions may require compensation for holders of state water rights
injured by the exercise of Indian reserved rights. Because non-Indian
water users face divestment of their water rights as a result of the federal
reserved rights doctrine, it seems only fair that they should receive just
compensation for their displaced property rights.
Finally, Justice O'Connor's draft of the unpublished majority opinion
in the Big Horn case would have radically limited the federal reserved
rights doctrine. She would have required Indian tribes to prove a
"reasonable likelihood" that future Indian irrigation projects will actually
be built, as a condition for an award of PIA for lands that have never
been irrigated. In addition, she would have refused a PIA award for
additional irrigation which either is not necessary to meet the realistic
needs of Indians living on their reservation or which would produce only
a marginal economic return for the tribe. At least one state court has
followed Justice O'Connor's lead. The trial court in Arizona's Gila
River Adjudication has confined the PIA analysis to a review of existing
proposals for agricultural development, and has required a showing of
"the general likelihood" of additional successful agricultural development.
Four of the Justices who would have joined Justice O'Connor's draft
opinion (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Stevens and
Kennedy) remain on the Supreme Court bench, while the three dissenters
(Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) are no longer on the bench.
While it is uncertain how the new Justices will view this issue, there is
a definite possibility that the "reasonable likelihood" standard will
become the law in the next big PIA case. O'Connor's draft opinion may
well be a portent of the future of the federal reserved rights doctrine.

